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| Assessment Pattern |
| Unit(s) of Assessment |
Weighting Towards Module
Mark (%)
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| 2 hour Examination |
70
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| Coursework 1 |
10
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| Coursework 2 |
20
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Qualifying Condition(s)
A weighted aggregated mark of 40% is required to pass the module |
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| Module Overview |
| This module first develops equilibria concepts for static, dynamic, complete and incomplete information games. These equilbria concepts are then applied to the banking environment to demonstrate how banks can reduce market frictions and promote the efficient allocation of resources |
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| Prerequisites/Co-requisites |
None |
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| Module Aims |
The aim of this module is to show how game theory and informational economics can be provide valuable insights in a broad variety of problems in economics and the social sciences |
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| Learning Outcomes |
By the end of this module students will:-
- understand how informaiton and dynamic assumptions lead to different equilibrium assumptions
- be able to solve for the following equilibria: Nash, subgame perfect, Bayesian and perfect Bayesian
- be able to aply these equilibria concepts to a wide range of problems in microeconomics, macroeconomics and banking
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| Module Content |
The following is an indication of the likely topics to be covered:-
- elements of a game, types of games and equilibria concepts
- static games of complete information: the Nash equilibrium
- dynamic games of complete information: the subgame perfect equilibrium
- static games of incomplete information: the Bayesian equilibrium
- dynamic games of incomplete information: the perfect Bayesian equilibrium
- the role of banks in the financial system
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| Methods of Teaching/Learning |
| Lectures (11), Tutorials (5) |
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| Last Updated |
10 March 2011 |
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